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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper uses network theory to examine the institutionalization of community 
governance in Los Angeles.  Since the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 mandated the 
created of neighborhood level bodies to foster “maximum feasible participation” in 
program development and implementation, we have witnessed rapid growth in local 
participative bodies.  Their success in developing legitimacy and promoting government 
accountability, however, has been highly varied.  Scholars have attributed this variation 
to a number of centralized design features (e.g. the degree of political support, the 
provision of organizational resources, the training for participants) and community 
characteristics (e.g. social capital, community capacity, SES).  Others point to system 
dynamics and historical processes.  For example, Putnam, Feldstein, and Cohen (2003) 
propose a model of positive feedback in which neighborhood-level activism promotes 
improved accountability which in turn promotes great activism. 
 
Building on the dynamic proposed by Putnam et. al., we develop a network model of 
institutionalization to explain the process by which neighborhood governance becomes 
regularized and meaningful.  We specifically incorporate the influence of central system 
features and community characteristics, acknowledging the goal complexity of citizen 
engagement entities (fostering community capacity, information sharing, greater 
government accountability, and popular mobilization).  We then illustrate the model 
employing social network data on the political networks that have arisen through the 
implementation of a system of neighborhood councils in Los Angeles.  At the system 
level, we show how the pattern of network evolution is related to the central design 
features of the LA system and pre-existing social capital.  Then we turn to community 
level factors and assess the extent to which community contextual factors and 
organizational dynamics influence network development, with implications for 
subsequent patterns of involvement and policy influence.  
 
Keywords:  political networks, institutionalization, participatory democracy, 
community governance 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Within urban governance, there has been increasing interest from both political leaders and 
scholars in the development of institutional reforms that promote citizen participation in 
administrative and political decision making (Berry, Portney, and Thomson 1993; Sirianni and 
Friedland 2001; Williamson and Fung 2005).  Examples of such reforms include neighborhood 
councils, citizen panels, participatory budgeting, and large scale experiments such as those 
conducted by America Speaks.  Still unclear is the effect of such reforms on political participation, 
democratic processes, and governance broadly.  Sirianni and Freidland (2001) state the situation 
succinctly, “The story [of civic innovation in America] is . . . one of innovation and learning but 
also one of roadblocks and detours, struggles and failures.” (p. 9).  In this paper we advance 
understanding of participatory governance by developing a network theory of how such 
innovations become politically institutionalized, and exploring how this theory explains the 
successes and shortcomings of one such innovation, the creation of a neighborhood council (NC) 
system in the City of Los Angeles. 
 
There is a tension in the growing scholarship on deliberative democracy about the extent to which 
it may lead to more informed and deliberative “citizen governance”(Box 1998).  The 
contradictions in the literature are perhaps best illustrated by the work of Archon Fung and 
collaborators setting the axis of optimism, while Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) serve as a 
stark counter-critic.  Fung and Wright (2003) argue that democratic participation can make 
governance more effective, and help educate and socialize participants.  In subsequent work, 
Fung (2004) argues that properly structured delegation of authority, what he terms empowered 
participation, can lead to improved outcomes in a variety of urban settings.  In contrast, Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse (2002) contend that most people resist participation, and that deliberative 
democracy reforms merely make matters worse by exacerbating political alienation and anger 
toward government. 
 
The contradictions in the literature in part relate to differing normative foci.  As participatory 
reforms are complex and frequently seek an array of constitutive and instrumental objectives, it is 
not surprising that evaluators may emphasize some goals over others. For example, proponents of 
such reforms typically emphasize constitutive effects such as the development of individuals’ 
sense of political efficacy and political skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Berry, Portney, 
and Thomson 1993).  Critics, on the other hand, focus on an array of normative ills, including 
representative biases (Cnaan 1991); citizen disillusionment or alienation (Arnstein 1969; Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse 2002) or system level conflict that arises due to new demands being placed on 
political and administrative decision makers (Huntington 1981; Moynihan 1965). 
 
In this paper, our primary normative concern is the extent to which participatory reforms enacted 
by government result in institutionalized patterns of political interaction in governance.  We 
define institutions as shared concepts used by individuals in repeated interactions that are 
organized by mutually understood rules, norms of behavior, and regularized patterns of behavior 
induced by those rules and norms (Crawford and Ostrom 1995; North 1990).  The goal of the 
paper is to understand the dynamics of institutionalization, understood as the process by which 
these rules and norms develop and are maintained over time.  The focus on institutions is critical, 
because these support the repeated interactions and relationships that create social capital, and in 
turn, more effective governance (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1995).   
 
In particular, we focus on how these institutions are constituted by the social networks that arise 
from political innovation.  Such a network perspective on political institutions is not entirely new.  
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Scholars have worked in this traditions to how the structure of networks and the position of actors 
within those networks influence the exercise of community power (Galaskiewicz 1979; Laumann 
and Pappi 1976), the non-profit sector (Knoke 1981, 1990), and policy networks(Marsh 1998; 
Peterson 1993; Rhodes 1997)Laumann, Knoke, and Kim 1985).  Our paper makes an important 
contribution by applying the network perspective to participatory governance reforms, and by 
considering the dynamic manner in which networks develop. 
 
The development of networks serves as a manifest measure for assessing changing patterns in 
political processes and political influence.  Moreover, this focus permits us to pay explicit 
attention to what have typically been implicit arguments about institutional dynamics.  Much of 
the social capital literature suggests that interaction between participatory bodies and government 
institutions creates a virtuous circle whereby increased participation improves government 
responsiveness which in turn increases the benefits of participation (Berry, Portney, and Thomson 
1993; Putnam and Feldstein 2003).  Others have pointed out the importance of early successes for 
establishing the legitimacy of participatory bodies (Chaskin 2003).  A dynamic network 
framework provides a more systematic means of examining these arguments about social capital 
development.  In particular, we consider how contextual variables (e.g. community 
characteristics) and institutional variables (e.g. system design and political characteristics) 
mediate the interaction between participation and government responsiveness. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  First, we present a theory of network development that explains 
how institutional innovation in the form of the creation of participatory bodies sets in motion the 
creation of new political networks.  We then provide a contextual discussion of the system reform 
to which we will apply this theory, the development of NCs in Los Angeles.  After a 
methodological discussion, we present results of an analysis of social network data from survey 
data of NC members and other system actors in Los Angeles.  We then trace the broader 
implications of how institutional structures influence the development networks and illustrate 
these dynamics with the case of Los Angeles NCs.    
 
II.  A Network Theory of Participatory Reform  
 
We theorize that citizen engagement reforms put in place distinctly co-evolutionary processes of 
institutional development involving the interaction of political/administrative arenas and 
emergent network structures.  A participatory reform typically will begin with an organizational 
innovation such as the creation of community councils or citizen panels, or modification of a 
political or administrative process, such as involvement of stakeholders systematically in 
budgetary processes.  These reforms thereby create new roles occupied by actors who bring 
specific skills, interests, and social connections to their work.  Operating within existing 
community and political structures, these actors begin an evolutionary process that creates new 
sets of relationships among citizens and between citizens and political and administrative 
decision-makers.  It is the emergent network of relationships that become the infrastructure that 
guides and promotes participatory activities.  The emergent network influences the form and 
effectiveness of representation of community interests in the decision-making process 
(Galaskiewicz 1979; Laumann and Pappi 1976), the distribution of information within 
neighborhood organizations (Granovetter 1973), access to resources (Knoke 1981; Lin 2006), the 
formation and maintenance of political attitudes evaluations (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), and 
the prospects for collective action (Oliver and Marwell 1988), 
 
The process of network evolution instigated by the creation of new participatory bodies involves 
a number of steps and feedback loops that are depicted in Figure 1.  First, individual activists 
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choose to take advantage of the opportunity to participate in newly formed bodies based on their 
individual characteristics, civic skills, and political attitudes, and city inputs into the creation of 
these organizations.  Once new bodies are formed, their members begin to develop relationships 
through meetings, community projects, and lobbying efforts.  The emergent structures of these 
networks are influenced by individual goals and political attitudes as well as the social and 
political contexts that shape the opportunities and challenges, benefits and costs of differing 
relationships.  In turn, the relational networks institutionalize and regularize participatory 
activities.  In addition, the networks of informal connections to the community and the tenor of 
organizational activities feed back to influence further recruitment into these bodies.  In the 
following paragraphs we elaborate each of these steps of the process illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
 
A.  Network Effects 
 
Individual factors have strong influences on both the choice of individuals to become engaged in 
a participatory opportunity, and their subsequent development of network relationships (Box A of 
Figure 1 above).  The choice to become active in participatory bodies depends on an individual’s 
interest in politics in general or in specific issues, their available resources, most importantly time 
and civic skills and network of recruitment (McAdams 1986; Tindall 2002; Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady 1995).  In addition, race or ethnicity of individuals is also a factor that predicts 
different degree of participation in voluntary associations (Williams, Babchuk, and Johnson 
1973).  In general all of these attributes are highly correlated with socio-economic status (SES), 
and there are observed SES biases in political participation that are particularly strong in the case 
of participatory bodies (Cnaan 1991; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  For example, 1990 
Citizen Participation survey data show just a small degree of elite bias toward church attendance 
with the top income group being 20 percent more likely to participate (56 percent to 67.2 
percent).1  This bias, though, is much stronger for volunteering for a local council where the high 
income group is more than 5 times more likely to participate (6.2 percent to 1.2 percent).  These 
biases are probably linked to the high degree of effort that participation entails, meaning that only 
the most highly committed and with the largest reserves of civic skills join.   
 
The self-selection of individuals into participatory bodies, in turn, sets in motion the evolution of 
political networks, with interpersonal ties shaped by complex factors including rational 
calculation of the instrumental benefits of relationships, psychological and affective factors, and 
social and institutional forces (Contractor and Monge 2003).  In particular, exchange theory 
(Contractor and Monge, 2003 chapter 7) suggests that while relationships confer advantages they 
are costly to develop and maintain.  Thus, individuals tend to seek out relationships in which the 
instrumental and affective benefits outweigh maintenance costs.  Benefits and costs are 
influenced by individual characteristics, the characteristics of others with whom they seek to form 
relationships, and the broader social and political context in which they operate.   
 
SES and education.  Among individual characteristics, SES is particularly important as it is a 
recognized determinant of political behavior  (Blais 2000; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Education in particular would appear to be an important 
factor.  Research on core discussion networks has shown that more educated whites tend to have 
larger networks (Marsden 1987; McPherson, Smithlovin, and Brashears 2006).  More highly 
educated people through their education and employment experiences are exposed to a broader 
                                                 
1
 Low income was defined as the bottom 37.6 percent of respondents and high income as the top 24.4 
percent of respondents. 
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range of people and tend to have greater “informational motives for new media” (Shah, Kwak, 
and Holbert 2001, p.154) which motivate them to seek out relationships for information exchange.  
Education is also associated with the acquisition of civic skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995) which facilitate networking and the development of  political attitudes, such as interest in 
politics and a sense of political efficacy, which should increase the perceived benefits of 
relationships, thereby increasing network size (Marsden 1987; Boisjoly, Duncan, and Hofferth 
1995; Putnam 1993).   
 
Diversity or homophily?  An issue that is unresolved in the network literature, but critical to our 
theory of participatory reform, is the extent to which people tend to seek diverse or 
“homophilous” ties.  Some argue that there are strong benefits to developing relationships with a 
broad range of diverse individuals.  In particular, relationships often develop around resource 
exchange, and the resources provided by relationships arguably increase with their diversity.  Lin 
(2006), for example, argues that social capital increases with the range of social positions 
occupied by an individual’s contacts.  Similarly, in his seminal article on weak ties, Granovetter 
argued that the range of relationships also matters in that social ties that extend beyond one’s 
tightly knit social group are essential for accessing information needed to support community 
collective action.   
 
Counteracting the benefits of diversity is the strong tendency of individuals in their normal social 
interactions toward homophily, the propensity to forge relationships with people how are similar 
(Marsden 1987; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Popielarz and McPherson 1995; 
McPherson and Smithlovin 1987; Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter 2003; Marsden 1988; Kalish 2008; 
Yuan and Gay 2006).  Relationships that cross political, ethnic, or class differences tend to 
involve a higher degree of social discomfort, and they are less likely to be a source of social 
support.  While the tendency to shun cross-cutting relationships diminishes with prior experience 
with inter-group contacts (Emerson, Kimbro, and Yancey 2002).the composition of voluntary 
civic associations has been found to be strongly shaped by homophily (Mutz and Mondak 2006; 
Weare, Musso, and Jun 2006).  In addition, in community studies the sets of ties between citizen 
groups and political elites is also affected by ethnic and class commonalities (Laumann and Pappi 
1976). 
 
Self-perpetuating social capital.  The costs of forming new relationships are expected to decline 
as a function of individuals’ pre-existing social capital.  Actors’ networks of social and 
associational relationships provide a base of community contacts that community activists can 
leverage in their new role.  For example, Verba et al find that fully 69 percent of respondents who 
contacted their local mayor’s office officials already knew the person they were trying to contact.  
So, those activists with larger pre-existing networks should develop more relationships associated 
with their role as a community representative.  In this sense there is a self-perpetuating character 
to the development of social capital. 
 
The set of people with whom an actor maintains relationships in turn affects their prominence or 
influence within a participatory institution.  The network literature has focused on two main 
mechanisms that promote influence:  centrality and brokerage (Brass and Burkhardt 1992; Burt 
2000; Freeman 1979).  Network centrality has a number of technical definitions but most broadly 
refers to prominence as a function of the degree to which actor is a central hub in a network 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994).  The most straightforward definition is degree centrality which 
refers to the total number of relationships an actor maintains.  From this perspective an actor 
gains increased prominence simply through involvement in a larger number of relationships 
(Galaskiewicz 1979).  A more subtle definition is “betweenness” centrality which measures the 
degree to which an actor connects others in a network, with attendant increases in power and 
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influence garnered by brokering resources among individuals.  Burt (2000) has expanded this 
concept to relate power and influence to structural holes, breaks in a network that separate 
differing groups.  Influence and power, then, are gained when actors broker between subgroups 
and control flows of information and resources.    
 
The networks that evolve as a result of these individual relational choices in turn have feedback 
effects on future decisions to participate.  Both the literatures on social movements and on 
political participation have demonstrated the importance of personal contacts and social relations 
for recruitment into political activities (McAdams 1986; Tindall 2002; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995).  Consequently, the networks formed by existing participants have a significant 
impact on the types of individuals who will volunteer subsequently.  Moreover, to the extent that 
homophily shapes the character of participatory networks, later recruitment will reinforce and 
magnify participatory biases (Liedka 1991).       
 
B. Contextual Factors 
 
Network formation will also be shaped by contextual factors including the characteristics of the 
community and of the participatory institutions that foster and regulate the activities of 
community representing organizations, as illustrated in Box B of Figure 1).  Research on the 
formation of voluntary associations and political and nonpolitical behaviors, such as network 
formation, report differing impacts of community contexts on individual choice (Bell and Force 
1956; Giles and Dantico 1982; Abowitz 1990; Huckfeldt 1983; Leighley 1990; Pattie and 
Johnston 1999; Lindstrom, Merlo, and Ostergren 2002; Huggins 2002; Ellen and Turner 1997; 
Huckfeldt 1979).  Huckfeldt (1979) finds that the higher SES individuals situated in high SES 
contexts are encouraged more to participate but lower SES individuals are not.  Giles and Dantico 
(1982) extends this study and argues that contexts influences socially based participation but not 
for individually based participation. Studying social networks, Huckfeldt (1983, p.667) finds that,  
 
[E]ven though individuals demonstrate strong associational preferences, their 
contextually structured set of associational opportunities makes itself felt in the 
composition of friendship groups. Thus, the social content of social networks is 
not solely a function of either the social context or individual choice; it is the 
complex product of individual preferences operating within the boundaries of a 
social context. 
 
Much of the research to date on contextual determinants of political behavior has focused on 
political behavior such as voting.  In particular, the political geography literature has employed 
multi-level analysis and hierarchical linear modeling techniques to demonstrated how the 
geographic proximity or embeddedness of individuals in certain particular communities constrain 
and influence individuals’ voting behavior (Pattie and Johnston 1999, 2000, 2002; Johnston, 
Jones, Sarker, Propper, Burgess, and Bolster 2004; Leighley and Nagler 1992; Tate 1974).  In 
addition, community level racial and economic diversity have been considered in the study of 
associative and political behavior (Baybeck 2001; Rotolo 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Rubenson 
2004; Huckfeldt 1979; Giles and Dantico 1982; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987) and in other 
societal outcomes (Brisson and Usher 2007; Ainsworth 2002).  Difficulties in teasing out 
individual-level effects (e.g. homophily) from community level factors leads to differing findings 
from these studies as to the effects of community contexts on network development.  
Nevertheless, many support the notion that ethnic and cultural divisions dampen opportunities to 
network (Coffé and Geys 2006; Small 2007; Peek 2001; Kim and Ball-Rokeach 2006).    
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On the other hand, pre-existing community capacity, including leadership, aggregate levels of 
social capital, sense of community, and organizational resources, should ease network 
development, controlling for individual characteristics (Tigges, Browne, and Green 1998; Stoll 
2001).  Consistently studies find the individuals in impoverished communities tends to have less 
pre-existing ties and this further limits in creating new ties (Small 2007).2  In this way, both 
individual social capital in the form of social ties, and aggregated community capacity, may have 
self-perpetuating effects that magnify socio-economic biases in that network institutionalization is 
facilitated within wealthier and more highly educated communities. 
 
Lastly, political and administrative context also influences network development through the 
effectiveness of contacts with various decision making bodies.  The networks that develop will 
interact within arenas for participation typically created by local governments as an adaptive 
strategy to manage citizen-city relationships (Yang and Callahan 2005; Walsh 1997; Nalbandian 
1999).  The nature of participatory opportunities provided are likely to shape—and potentially be 
shaped by—the type of political network that emerges.  These relationships in turn create 
complex patterns of path dependency and feedback.  It is not uncommon for proponents of 
participatory democracy to posit implicitly a positive feedback model of this dynamic in which 
greater citizen participation (e.g., more network ties with decision-makers) leads to improved 
political and administrative responsiveness and in turn, improved responsiveness induces 
increases in participation.  Indeed empirical studies that find successful results for citizen 
participation innovations also find that these reforms included active political support and 
administrative reforms that created forums for participation (Berry, Portney, Bablitch, and 
Mahoney 1984; Lowndes, Pratchett, and Stoker 2006; Berry, Portney, and Thomson 1993; Fung, 
Wright, and Abers 2003).  Fung’s (2004) findings on the benefits of empowered participation 
were drawn from administrative initiatives in Chicago that provided training, mobilization 
campaigns, and mechanisms for administrative accountability based on the performance of 
participatory bodies – all of which were integral to the success of the system.   
 
The creation of a positive feedback dynamic is not however a foregone conclusion.  In contrast, 
the interaction between institutional form and individual capacities can limit participation.  For 
instance, Mansbridge (2003) notes that town-hall style meetings advantage those with greater 
civic skills.  Also, if elected and administrative officials meet citizen efforts to participate in 
public decision making with tokenism, therapy or other less-than-cooperative reactions (Arnstein 
1969) activists will likely react with anger or seek other avenues to influence policy (Cobb and 
Elder 1972).    
 
In sum, three clusters of factors – individual self-selection as participants, network formation, and 
community and political/administrative contexts are interrelated within an evolutionary process 
that strongly supports a path-dependent dynamic of institutionalization (Barley, Freeman, and 
Hybels 1992).  This more finely grained theory of participatory evolution promotes attention to 
both individual factors and network theoretical concepts in explaining the success of participatory 
reforms.  It also extends attention to community context—typically found within the literature on 
voting—to explain voluntary community participation.  We expect political reforms to proceed in 
a process that is neither neat nor determinative, but one in which initial conditions, administrative 
design choices, and micro-level processes interact to have large cumulative effects on system 
performance.  In a case where administrative support and response is lacking, as we argue is the 
situation in Los Angeles, the costs of certain types of network ties are likely to be higher, and 
                                                 
2
 While community capacity has been studied as one aspect of social capital, there are important, though 
nuanced differences.  That is the more social capital one or community posses, the more the community 
resources.   
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their benefits diminished, with implications for the ultimate character of the network and the 
concomitant nature of citizen participation.  
 
III.  Democracy by Design in Los Angeles 
 
We explore the dynamics of participatory institutionalization using the case of NC development 
in Los Angeles, which enacted a self-organizing citywide system of NCs through a charter reform 
referendum in 1999.  In large part motivated by secession movements throughout the City, the 
reform was sought to involve communities more in City processes of policy making, service 
delivery, and land use.  The charter stated that NCs were to “promote more citizen participation in 
government and make government more responsive to local needs … Neighborhood Councils 
shall include representatives of many diverse interests in communities and shall have an advisory 
role on issues of concern to the neighborhood” (Los Angeles City Charter, Article IX, Section 
900). 
 
The system that emerged from the 1999 reforms can be characterized as hybrid in character, 
combining elements of both grassroots voluntarism and representative democracy.  While NCs 
have purely advisory powers, the City provides resources and has structured arenas for 
participation in city governance.  The City has created an “Early Notification System” to provide 
electronic notification of impending City Council and commission matters, so that NCs may 
provide input to the policy process.  In addition, NCs may advise the Mayor’s budget process, 
and are directed to monitor and facilitate service delivery.  Each certified NC receives $50,000 
annually from the City to support operations and activities.  Thus the reform resulted in a system 
of largely grassroots voluntary associations that promote stakeholder deliberation on community 
matters.  At the same time, these organizations receive funding from the City, they had to satisfy 
specified certification requirements including a set of bylaws, and they also must abide by basic 
requirements with respect to open meeting requirements, disclosure rules, and election of 
governing board members.  What makes the NCs particularly interesting from a standpoint of 
network development is that they combine elements of both representative and deliberative 
democracy and of formal government and grass-roots voluntarism. 
 
The NC system is also an excellent case for exploring the dynamics of institutional development 
because the system emerged to a large extent through self-organization, but within arenas and 
subject to design constraints that were put into place by the City, both in the original charter, and 
in subsequent implementation decisions (Musso and Kitsuse 2002).  From the onset, the system 
was a reluctant reform, in part a placatory response to mobilization on the part of the City’s NCs, 
while also reflecting the broader political exigencies of charter reform.  While the NC idea had 
been debated in City Council in the mid-1990s, it had never been able to attract a majority, and 
the mayor who advocated for Charter reform was not interested in the concept.  According to 
Sonenshein (2004) the concept was initially promoted by unions who wanted to develop an 
attractive platform to elect their slate onto the elected charter reform commission.  It proved to 
the part of charter reform that garnered the most popular interest throughout commission 
deliberations on charter reform, and was a strong political selling point in the ultimate passage of 
the measure.3 
 
Implementation subsequently proceeded through a push-pull implementation system, in which 
implementing agents (City council; the Mayor’s office, and the Department of Neighborhood 
                                                 
3
 The charter reform also created several other systemic changes, such as strengthening the power of the 
Mayor vis-à-vis City Council, and decentralizing land use review to area planning commissions.  It also 
included a separate, unsuccessful measure to increase the size of Los Angeles’s 15 member city council. 
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Empowerment established by the reform) interacted with community activists who quickly 
mobilized and began advocating for particular design features.  An early tension involved the 
degree of standardization and regulation that would be built into the system.  As we discuss in 
detail elsewhere, this tension was largely resolved in favor of providing a high degree of local 
discretion regarding development of geographic boundaries and of the governance structures 
embodied within the by-laws submitted to the City for approval.  NCs were conceptualized from 
quite early on to be self-organizing in character, a design decision that we will argue strongly 
influenced the subsequent character of the emergent system. 
 
Also worthy of note is that despite the City’s relatively limited investment in outreach and 
organizing of the emergent system, community leadership emerged soon after enactment of the 
Charter, and community activists both influenced the implementation design for NCs, and were 
leaders in the subsequent development and certification of NCs (Musso, Kitsuse, Lincove, Sithole, 
and Cooper 2002).  Considering the scale and diversity of Los Angeles, a city of 460 square miles 
and almost 4 million residents, it is quite remarkable that within two years of plan adoption, more 
than half the city had been incorporated into NC boundaries, while as of this writing, there are 88 
councils of which 83 have sitting elected boards that represent the community (Department of 
Neighborhood Empowerment 2007).  The typical NC represents a community averaging 40,000 
in size, with a governing board averaging 21. 
 
The implementation of NCs was reviewed by a city-mandated appointed commission in 2007, the 
findings of which mirrored those of an independent multi-year evaluation study conducted by the 
authors (Musso, Weare, Elliot, Kitsuse, and Shiau 2007).  While the emergence of a city-wide 
system was commendable under the circumstances, the governance capacity of NCs has varied 
dramatically across the City.  Some have become quite involved in proactive land use planning 
and design review, while others have been mired in controversy and infighting (Musso, Jun, and 
Elliot 2006).  They have had several notable successes in mobilizing citywide in response to 
organizational or political proposals, and a measure of their influence is that 13 of the 29 
members of the City’s NC review commission were past or current NC activists.   
 
Much of the impact of the system has apparently been at the community level, or with respect to 
systemic mobilization in response to city proposals.  They have been less evident or interested in 
either budgetary involvement, where the Mayor’s budget system has struggled to attain broad-
based participation among the City’s communities (Musso, Sithole, Elliot, and Weare 2007)I  
They have been virtually absent in the administrative arenas of the City; many city departments 
are barely cognizant of the system, and in a survey of city administrators, NCs were sited as the 
least important of external stakeholders both in terms of providing information and influencing 
departmental policy.   
 
Overall, the first seven years of experience with NCs has not been received with over whelming 
success in terms of either improved administrative responsiveness or civic engagement.  In 2003 
and 2006 NC board members were asked to rate the performance of city government in solving 
problems.  Thirty five percent rated the city as good or excellent in 2003, but this number 
declined to 28.2 percent in 2006.  More generally, the Policy Institute of California  polled 
residents of the City and County of Los Angeles City on their rating of various city services.  
Comparing 2003 and 2005 in Figure 2, we find that LA city residents’ level of satisfaction 
decreased during the institutionalization of NCs and remained consistently below the level of 
residents of other cities in LA county.   
 
[Figure 2 About Here] 
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In addition, after five years of experience with NCs, Angelenos are distinctly less confident that 
NCs have a positive impact on the governance of the city (Figure 3). 
 
[Figure 3 About Here] 
 
In the next section we describe our methods, after which we analyze the factors that influence 
joining behavior and in turn, the development of institutionalized networks of political 
involvement in neighborhood councils.  We argue that several factors are particularly important 
in shaping network development in Los Angeles:  general socio-economic biases in individual 
decisions to participate, the city’s reliance on self-organization of councils, and limited 
investment in participatory arenas, and the forces of homophily in development of ties to 
community groups.   
 
IV.  Data and Methods  
 
This paper presents analysis of data from our multi-methodological, multi-year study of NC 
development in Los Angeles.  We rely primarily on two sources of data 1) census tract data from 
the 2000 U.S. Census aggregated to correspond to NC boundaries and 2) network surveys of Los 
Angeles NCs conducted by University of Southern California in 2003 and 2006.  These data are 
augmented by extensive field notes on NCs and three general population surveys of Los Angeles 
County residents conducted by the Public Policy Institute of California between 2003 and 2005.  
The U.S. census data provides community level information on demographic characteristics and 
home ownership rates.   
 
The NC surveys targeted elected board members and collected political and demographic data as 
well as data on the internal social networks of board members.  The questionnaire items of most 
importance in this paper presented board members with lists of city offices and departments, 
community stakeholder groups, and other NCs.  They were then asked which of these actors they 
were in contact with in the two weeks just before your most recent NC meeting.  
 
At the time of the first NC survey in 2003, 45 boards had been certified by the City of Los 
Angeles and had sitting elected boards.  We were unable to obtain complete lists of board 
members for four boards, and they consequently were excluded from this analysis.  Members of 
this research team personally visited board meetings and invited members to take the survey 
either online or by telephone in the summer of 2003.  The survey also was made available in 
Spanish.  Out of 894 total board members, 587 respondents began the survey for a response rate 
of 66 percent.  The second round of the survey was administered in a similar manner in 2006.  By 
that time there were 85 certified boards, although three were almost entirely inactive.  There were 
1488 total board members on the 82 active boards of whom 703 responded to the survey for a 
response rate of 47 percent. 
 
To analyze and illuminate the co-evolutionary process outlined in Figure 1, we take a multi-
method approach that seeks to capture both the overall institutional evolution of NCs and to 
identify the main factors driving the process.  To chart the macro-level evolution, we focus on the 
three types of ego-centric ties maintained by board members:  ties to 1) community stakeholders, 
2) city offices and departments, and 3) other NCs.  We assess the evolution of NCs by examining 
the changes in the characteristics of board members and their networks between 2003 and 2006.  
We then a number of regression models to explore how micro-level individual and contextual 
effects mediate the formation of relationships that aggregate to these observed networks.  We also 
rely on extensive field and interview data to illustrate and highlight the dynamics at play.  
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V.  Findings 
 
We begin our examination of network evolution by laying out the broad patterns of network 
growth and retrenchment as the system of NCs became institutionalized.  We then turn to our 
dynamic model in Figure 1 to examine the micro forces at work at the various stages that help 
explain the observed pattern of institutionalization in Los Angeles. 
 
a. Network Growth:  Horizontal versus Vertical Ties 
 
With the passage of the charter reform measure, we observed the initiation of political activity, 
and as noted above a citywide system had evolved within four years following the adoption of an 
implementation plan.  Participation in the system is evident both in the involvement of elected 
board members, of which there are approximately 1,800 in the City, as well as attendance at 
regular NC meetings.  Most NCs hold meetings every month, and average attendance at these 
meetings is about 22 people, with some particularly salient meetings attracting hundreds of 
stakeholders.  In addition, NCs reach out to their communities with most holding community 
events (78.8 percent) and a smaller number (42.9 percent) circulating regular newsletters.    
 
Through these activities, networks began to emerge early in the development of NCs.  In the 2003 
survey the average NC board member reported being in contact with 7.5 other board members in 
the two weeks prior to the last board meeting.  In addition, they contacted on average 2.3 city 
offices or departments and a representative from 2.7 different stakeholder groups in their 
community.4  Horizontal networks in contrast were sparse; on average about every two NC board 
members was in contact with someone from another NC (See Figure 4). 
 
[Figure 4 About Here] 
 
Replication of the network survey three years later demonstrated some areas of growth and of 
stagnation in the shape of emergent networks.  Although many NC representatives had gained 
significant experience in operating the organizations and had overcome some of the difficulties 
entailed in organizational maintenance, some networking activities had stagnated.  This was 
particularly true of what one might term “vertical” ties between NCs and stakeholders in the 
community, or representatives in the City.  Board members tended to talk to slightly fewer fellow 
board members than before, and about the same number of city offices or departments.  
Stakeholder contacts actually declined significantly on average from 2.7 to 2.0.  Other indicators 
and our field observations corroborate these network patterns.  Reports from city project 
coordinators who work with the councils indicate that stakeholder participation in committees and 
attendances at meetings declined between 2003 and 206. In addition, in self-evaluations, board 
members rated outreach as a particular challenge and source of frustration, and cited with some 
bitterness lack of response from city officials.   
 
In contrast, horizontal contacts had increased significantly between our two waves of network 
survey.  The average number of other NCs contacted increased from .41 to 2.3 and the average 
number of citywide meetings in which members from differing NCs tended to come into contact 
increased from 2.0 to 2.6. 
 
                                                 
4
 The respondents were asked about their contacts with 1) business owners, 2) employees of local 
businesses, 3) property owners, 4) homeowners, 5) renters, 6) social service agencies, 7) schools, and 8) 
faith-based organizations.   
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B.  Emergent Boards 
 
Because of the path dependency discussed in our theoretical discussion, we would expect the 
initial composition of boards to have a strong and lasting effect on the networks of participatory 
activities promoted by new participatory organizations.  To create a board a community group 
had to submit an application for certification including bylaws, boundary of their community, and 
petitions indicating community support.  The groups were entirely self-organizing and the 
members who originally won elections to sit on these boards were primarily composed of these 
early organizers.  As is expected, early board members, who volunteered long and difficult hours, 
demonstrated a distinct bias toward higher SES compared to the general population of Los 
Angeles.  As Table 1 indicates, in 2003 board members were much more likely have household 
incomes that exceeded $100,000 than other residents (33.2 to 13.6 percent), were more likely to 
have college degrees (72.9 to 22.9 percent), and were more likely to own homes (80.7 to 38.7 
percent).  The ethnic composition of board members was also skewed to whites who made up 
53.4 percent of boards but only 29.5 percent of city residents.  Latinos and Asian were heavily 
underrepresented (17.2 to 46.5 percent and 5.1 to 9.9 percent respectively).  African-Americans 
were the only traditional minority group that was proportionately highly represented on boards.     
 
[Table 1 About Here] 
 
The descriptive representativeness of NCs, however, should not be unduly emphasized while the 
initial composition of boards also greatly influences participatory and substantive forms of 
representation (Guo and Musso 2006).  The relationship between descriptive and substantive 
representation is more nuanced.  For example, Rosenthal (1995) and Thomas (1994) find 
evidence that “people’s characteristics are a guide to the actions they will take” (Pitkin 1967, 
p.89).  The simple logic of this assumption is questioned by others (Young 2000; Mansbridge 
1999) and Donahue (1999) has found some evidence to dispute the relationship.   
 
Regarding substantive representation, NCs’ policy concerns do seem closely related to their 
descriptive character in that they center around a local quality-of-life agenda.  In Figure 5, we 
display the percentage of board members and residents of Los Angeles that cite specific policy 
issues as major problems in Los Angeles.  In both 2003, board members most frequently 
identified public safety, transportation, and land use as major problems.  These preferences share 
both commonalities and differences with the general population.  Los Angeles residents also 
highlighted a strong concern for public safety, but lower levels of concern about transportation 
and land use.  LA residents, in contrast, were much more likely than board members to be 
concerned about education and the economy.   
 
[Figure 5 About Here] 
 
C.  Forging network Relationships 
 
We next examine the individual level factors that shape the number and types of relationships 
formed and maintained by board members.  We ran three OLS regressions predicting the number 
of different types of relationships.  The first dependent variable is the number of different 
community stakeholders groups with which the respondent was in contact.  The second is the 
number of different city offices and departments, and the third is the number other NCs.5  As 
                                                 
5
 The number of stakeholder groups ranges between 0 and 8.  The number of city departments ranges from 
0 to 11.  These contacts include the mayor’s office, their city council representative’s office, the office of 
another city council representative, and eight departments such as police, fire, planning, and libraries.  The 
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explanatory variables we include measures of SES, income and education.  We include a number 
of measures of social capital and attachment to one’s community.  Community tenure measures 
the number of year a respondent has lived in their current community.  Visit neighbors measures 
frequency with which one talks with or visits their immediate neighbors.  Volunteering measures 
the average number of hours one spends volunteering in their community, and Associational ties  
is an index of associational involvement that count the number of associational and the level of 
involvement within association.6  We include a measure of group political efficacy, Political 
Efficacy, to capture the perceived value of relationships.  We also include Media Use which is an 
index that combines the frequency of use of print, broadcast, and internet media to learn about 
local affairs.  A dummy variable, White, is included to test for differences in networking activities 
between ethnic groups.  Finally, in the regressions predicting the number of stakeholder and city 
contacts, we include Attend City Meetings which measures the frequency with which the 
respondent attending meetings that brought together. 
 
The results appear in Table 2.  Counter to expectations higher SES of individuals does not 
significantly increase network contacts.  Except in Model II the coefficients for income and 
education are not statistically significant, and in the one case in which it is significant higher 
levels of education are actually associated with fewer city contacts.  Nor do white board members 
appear to have larger networks, though there is a marginally significant relationship between race 
and contacts with other boards.  These results may reflect the relatively low variability of SES 
and ethnicity among board members.  It is also possibly the case that a relationship observed in 
the general population will be muted in that members of all SES and ethnic backgrounds self-
select into boards with the goal of forging civic relationships.  Tenure in one’s community does 
not increase member’s propensity to network, indeed, it has a negative and marginally 
statistically significant effect on contacting community stakeholders.  It is possible that this is in 
part a function of community dynamics; when communities are changing visibly due to 
immigration, people with long tenure may be less likely to reach out to new groups. 
 
We find that a propensity to visit with neighbors, a social capital measure, increases community 
contacts, supporting the points made earlier about the self-perpetuating nature of social capital.  
The effect of this factor on city contacts is much smaller however and only marginally significant.  
Nor does this measure of social capital affect horizontal networking with other NCs, suggesting 
that the influence of social capital on institutional development is nuanced. 
 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
Volunteering and associational ties consistently have the largest impact on networking, as 
measured by the standardized betas.  This again emphasizes the self-perpetuating character of 
social capital by indicating the importance of leveraging pre-existing community ties for activities 
in these participatory organizations.  For example, a one standard deviation increase in 
associational activity is related to a .24 standard deviation increase in city contacts.  Also, 
attending citywide meetings of NC members is strongly and positively associated with 
                                                                                                                                                 
number of other NCs ranges between 0 to a maximum of six (even though there are over eighty councils) 
because the survey accepted at most six nominations.  This censoring skews the data somewhat because 
there are a small number of board members with more contacts, but the number is relatively small given 
that only about 5 percent of the respondents lists six board contacts.   
6
 Past memberships are counted as 1, current memberships are counted as 2, active members counted as 3 
and holding an office within an association counted a r.   These values were summed over 13 standard 
types of civic associations, and the index ranged between 0 and 45 with a median of 13.   
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stakeholders and the city contacts, supporting the notion that as board members striving to gain 
influence, vertical contacts become more valuable as they broker structural holes between NCs.    
 
The results with respect to the influence of political efficacy on participation are mixed.  While 
the coefficients are positive as expected in all three equations, efficacy clearly plays a more 
important role in promoting horizontal networking rather than vertical ties.  Media use is 
positively associated with networking in all three cases.  It is not statistically significant for 
community stakeholder contacts, though, and it has a much larger beta coefficient for horizontal 
networking.   
 
We also observe a high degree of homophily in networking with community stakeholders.  Board 
members are twice as likely to be in contact with community members from the same stakeholder 
group as would be expected purely by chance.7   Seventy-two percent of board members report 
being in contact with a community member from the same stakeholder group (e.g. a businesses 
owner speaking to a business owner).    
 
To examine the contextual effects on networking, we run a number of hierarchical linear models 
(HLM) again employing stakeholder, city, and NC contacts as the dependent variables.  HLM 
allows us to examine both the effects of individual level variables and how contextual (e.g., 
higher level) variables mediate the relationship between individual level variables (Bryk and 
Raudenbush 1992).  Due to the small size of boards, however, the power of HLM with these data 
is limited.  Thus, we are constrained to estimating parsimonious models.8   
 
The two levels of our model are depicted in Figure 6.  In the first level we model contacts as a 
function of a measure of social capital, Associational Ties, because this variable was one of the 
most important for explaining network  formation.  At the second level, we then include a 
measure of community heterogeneity to test the degree to which heterogeneous contexts inhibit 
the formation of relationships.   
 
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 3.  While the overall fit of these models is not 
impressive due to data constraints, the results are suggestive.  In accordance with the OLS results 
the estimate of γ10  is positive and statistically significant in all three equations, indicating that 
individual’s pre-existing social capital does play a role in network formation.  In models I and II 
the estimates of γ01 is negative and statistically significant, indicating that community 
heterogeneity (i.e., in terms of educational attainment) decreases the average number of contacts 
that NC boards have with stakeholders and the city.  In contrast, γ01 is not significant in Model III 
which means the dampening affect of educational heterogeneity in the community does not affect 
the amount of horizontal networking across the city.  Finally, in none of the three models is γ11 
significant indicating that while community heterogeneity decreases the average number of 
contacts it does not dampen the positive influence that social capital has on networking.   
 
[Table 3 About Here] 
 
D.  Network Effects on Recruitment 
 
                                                 
7
 These calculations assume that all eight would be equally likely to be contacted by chance and it controls 
for the number of stakeholder groups which each board member is in contact.   
8
 With few degrees of freedom for the individual, level 1 regression models limit the reliability of the slope 
and intercept estimates for individuals within each NC. 
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The networks developed by NC members and the particular activities they undertake do appear to 
have feedback effects on recruitment of new members.  The main manner in which individuals 
come to serve on these boards is through direct contact with a board or through personal contacts.  
Over 51percent of board members surveyed said that they heard about their NC through members 
of the NC, and 37 percent heard about them through family or friends.  In contrast, only 35 
percent heard about it through media and only 17 percent through a city official.   
 
This method of recruitment in combination with the tendency for homophilous community 
relationships should reinforce the socio-economic characteristics of and policy preferences of 
boards.  This pattern, though slight, is observed.  As seen in Table 1 and Figure 5 between 2003 
and 2006 the percentage of white, highly educated, and relatively affluent individuals tended to 
dominant board membership even more.9  In addition, the percentage of board members who 
cited traffic and land use as major problems also increased. 
 
E.  Institutional Factors on Network Development 
 
Lastly, the degree to which network development was shaped by the development of participatory 
forums and the responsiveness of elected and administrative officials is more complex and has to 
be assessed qualitatively based on field observations.  There is much evidence, nevertheless, that 
the evolution of networks was shaped by the degree to which forging and maintaining 
relationships with city officials yielded net benefits to board members.  Los Angeles has 
progressive-era government institutions that are highly bureaucratized and shielded 
administratively from political influence and stakeholder pressures (Cooper and Musso 1999)  In 
this environment, the City Council had taken on a prominent mediating role between citizens and 
the bureaucracy.10  This role is evident in the pattern of city contacts in that a majority of NC 
board members (55.3 percent) report being in contact with their council office.  In contrast the 
level of contacting is far lower for other city offices.  The Department of Neighborhood 
Empowerment was contacted by 34.6 percent of respondents and 29.7 percent had contact with 
the Police Department, but no other department was contacted by more than a fifth of the board 
members. 
 
As we theorized, because networks are more likely to form when more responsive city officials 
increase the value of relationships, council offices that were more supportive of NCs would 
promote greater contact with the city, but such an association is not evident in the observed 
pattern of contacts.  This lack of association may indicate that all council offices share similar 
constituent service orientations and that the institutional factors shaping network formation are 
more systemic. 
 
Systemically, the city provided tepid support to NCs.  The General Manager of Department of 
Neighborhood Empowerment, who took over in 2007, commented that she was surprised by the 
pervasive disinterest in working with NCs on the part of city employees.  In our 2006 of board 
members, the most frequently cited problems with the system focused on communication with the 
city and responsiveness of city employees.  Also, while the charter reform called for the mayor to 
involve NCs in the budgetary process, these efforts were marked by tokenism and did little to 
                                                 
9
 Unless otherwise indicated, data compares responses from 41 NC boards surveyed in 2003 with 86 boards 
surveyed in 2006. Los Angeles City figures are from the 2000 U.S. Census. 
10
 Interestingly, this mediating role has continued after the 1999 Charter reform even though the intention 
of new charter was to elevate the role of the mayor and of NCs in improving the delivery of municipal 
services. 
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encourage NCs to deliberate with stakeholders on budget priorities (Musso, Sithole, Elliot, and 
Weare 2007).   
 
The manner in which this lack of political and administrative support for NC involvement 
hampered the forging of vertical networks and promoted horizontal networks can be seen in the 
development of the NC Congress.  The charter called for the Department of Neighborhood 
Empowerment to help plan and convene biannual congresses of NCs.  Rather than creating a 
space in which participants could debate and address city issues, the city-run congresses have 
been primarily training seminars and information expositions for city departments.  In reaction to 
this lack of policy content, a city-wide group of NC activists joined forces to create a more 
deliberative forum.  This city rebuffed efforts by this group to begin running the official congress, 
but they have continued to operate in parallel.   
 
V. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
We have presented a model of the institutionalization of participatory bodies based on a co-
evolutionary process in which political networks and administrative structures interact, a model 
that highlights the complex and contingent characteristic of participatory reforms.  Our empirical 
work speaks to the complex factors by which democratic design unfolds.  The Los Angeles 
experience suggests that participatory reforms can lead to new and impactful political networks, 
even in the absence of political support and meaningful arenas for participation, factors that have 
been identified as critical building blocks of participation (Berry, Portney and Thomson; Fung).   
 
What we contribute is the insight that the particular form that participatory networks take is  
contingent on individual-level choices shaped by the characteristics of individuals who participate 
and on the contexts in which they operate.  Pre-existing social capital plays a central role in the 
development of all types of network relationships.  This result supports the contention that social 
networks are a true form of “capital” that promotes production of further relationships (ADLER).  
The forces and motivations that promote horizontal versus vertical networks, however, differ.  
Vertical ties—for example, those from board members to community stakeholders, or from board 
members to city council member—are impeded by heterogeneity, and positively influenced by 
political and administrative support.  In a diverse city, with tepid political and administrative 
support, these mediating ties have stagnated.  In contrast, heterogeneity does not seem to affect 
adversely the development of horizontal ties, perhaps because that form of tie development is 
motivated by desire for influence, where diverse relationships increase resource mobilization.  
 
The results with respect to the development of vertical networks are somewhat discouraging from 
a standpoint of empowered democracy.  The tendencies toward homophily in promoting vertical 
ties, and the influence of SES on board member self-selection, have a mutually reinforcing effect 
in that board members do not appear to interact much with community members, and when they 
do, interact with similar stakeholders.  A similar mutually reinforcing process has limited the 
vertical ties developing from NCs to City agencies.  City administrators and office holders, many 
of whom view neighborhood councils as little more than large homeowners’ associations, have 
been hesitant to embrace neighborhood councils as new participatory bodies that differ from the 
range of constituent groups with whom they interact.  From the perspective of neighborhood 
councils, the unresponsiveness on the part of city administrators and the Mayor decrease the 
value of such ties and have limited the evolution of vertical ties to the city.  Path dependency is 
evident in that the majority of NC contacts with the City are with City Council offices, which 
were the “go-to” agencies prior to reform.   
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In Los Angeles, what has emerged is a horizontal mobilization network that links neighborhoods 
across an extremely diverse and dispersed city, and which provides a capacity for oversight of 
city politics that did not exist prior to reform.  These horizontal networks build political capacity 
for community sub-elites to challenge downtown development and tax politics, and their 
emergence appears to have been motivated from the start by simmering discontent with the 
actions of city leaders.  As we discuss elsewhere, there was a social movement flavor to the 
development of these networks, as the perception of the City’s failure with respect to system 
implementation paradoxically motivated volunteer involvement in its creation (Musso and 
Kitsuse—Haynes conference paper). 
 
The implicit and explicit choices made by City of Los Angeles in designing its community 
participation reforms have had very real effects on the structure and ultimately the function of the 
participatory network.  The City authorized a system that was largely self-organizing from the 
grassroots, with relatively limited mandates or direct support for community outreach to the 
grassroots.  Additionally there was weak political support at best for involvement of the new NCs 
in city deliberations; many administrative departments ignored the new entities; and the Mayor’s 
budget process was highly tokenistic in design.  As a result, neighborhood council activities have 
focused heavily on City Council and a small number of administrative departments, such as 
Planning or Department of Water and Power, motivated frequently by mobilization against land 
use or taxation decisions.  This is a very different picture of participation than the “empowered 
participatory democracy” that characterized delegation of community policing and educational 
involvement in Chicago (Fung, 2004). 
 
In sum, our results also show that the optimistic findings reported by Berry, Portney, and 
Thomson and Fung are highly dependent on administrative reforms.  In particular, an important 
potential function of community councils is to serve as mediating institutions, channeling 
community preferences to city administrators.  This function has been hampered in Los Angeles 
by a lack of support for outreach, the tendencies toward homophily in developing vertical ties, 
and lack of arenas for NC participation in the City.  Future research on participatory organizations 
elsewhere might consider whether delegated authority, of the sort described by Fung (2004) 
builds vertical ties between stakeholders and city officials, while perhaps having more limited 
effects in terms of capacity for cross-city horizontal mobilization.  This points to the importance 
of considering network factors in designing participatory democratic reforms, as design decisions 
made in the formulation and implementation of these systems have profound effects on the 
relational networks that institutionalize subsequent engagement in civic affairs. 
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Figure 1:  Conceptual Framework 
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Figure 2:  Los Angeles Residents' Ratings of City Services 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Percent of Los Angeles Adults Who Responded "Yes" to NC Questions in 2002 and 2007 
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Figure 4:  Average NC member Contacts and Meeting Attendance 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Issue Representation: NC Board versus City of LA 
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Figure 6:Structure of Hierarchical Linear Models 
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Table 1:  Socio-economic Characteristics Compared Between LA Residents and NC Board Members 
 2000 Census 
City of LA 
2003 
NC Boards 
2006 
NC Boards 
Income 
 % $100,000+  
 
13.6% 
 
33.2 
 
41.5 
Education 
 % with BA degree 
 
22.9% 
 
72.9 
 
76.6 
Homeownership 
 % homeowners 
 
38.7% 
 
80.7 
 
82.4 
Ethnicity 
 % White 
 % African-American 
 % Latino 
 % Asian 
 
29.5% 
10.9% 
46.5% 
9.9% 
 
53.4 
18.6 
17.2 
5.1 
 
64.8 
9.3 
15.2 
3.3 
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Table 2::  OLS Regression on Network Contacts 
  
I 
Stakeholder 
Contacts 
II 
City 
Contacts 
III 
Other NC 
Contacts 
-0.018 0.041 -0.066 Income (-0.38) (0.93) (-1.484) 
    
-0.054 -0.094** -0.031 Education (-1.153) (-2.168) (-0.710) 
    
-0.087* 0.012 -0.006 Community Tenure (-1.905) (0.273) (-0.148) 
    0.121*** 0.072* 0.043 Visit Neighbors (2.753) (1.738) (1.006) 
    0.127*** 0.244*** 0.157*** Volunteering (2.595) (5.334) (3.333) 
    0.195*** 0.113** 0.076 Associational Ties (3.952) (2.454) (1.597) 
    
0.079* 0.074* 0.113*** Political Efficacy (1.765) (1.776) (2.644) 
    0.014 0.061 0.074* White (0.297) (1.412) (1.670) 
    0.062 0.097** 0.144*** Media Use (1.347) (2.265) (3.286) 
    0.121*** 0.240*** 
  Attend Citywide Meetings  (2.676) (5.703) 
  
R2 .142 .249 .106 
Reported coefficients are standardized betas.  T-scores appear in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level 
**    Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 3:   Explaining Social Network Dynamics: Intercepts- and Slopes-as-Outcomes Model 
 HLM Models 
Fixed Effects: 
Explanatory Factors 
Model I 
DV: Total Stakes 
Model II 
DV: Total City 
Model III 
DV:  Total NCs 
Model for NC mean    
-- Intercept (β0)    
-----Intercept (γ00) 2.064*** 2.434*** 1.058** 
-----Heterogeneity (γ01)  -4.218**  -4.066** 0.697 
Model for slopes    
-- Associational Ties (β1)    
-----Intercept (γ10) 0.072*** 0.095*** 0.039*** 
-----Heterogeneity (γ11) 0.123 0.330 0.075 
Model Statistic (χ2)   100.968*  113.072**  83.052 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
